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Corporate Multinationality and Acquirer Returns  
 
Abstract: This paper provides evidence on how corporate multinationality from the perspective of 
acquiring firms relates to M&A returns. Using multivariate regressions and a large dataset of over 6,000 
M&As (both cross-border and domestic) by UK firms during 1987 to 2014, the paper finds 
multinationality to be associated with significantly higher short-run announcement returns and long-run 
operating performance. While the multinationality premium (higher M&A returns for multinationals) 
persists over time, it seems to be restricted to firms with superior resource/managerial capabilities and 
minimal agency problems. Finally, the multinationality premium appears to be driven by foreign 
acquisitions into advanced economies. The results are robust to correcting for sample selection bias and 
controlling for several firm and deal characteristics, as well as accounting for firm-, industry-, and year-
fixed effects. Collectively, the findings imply that multinationality could be a source of value creation 
for acquiring firms, particularly in foreign acquisitions, which tend to be complex, and thereby, require 
superior managerial capabilities to succeed.   
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Many of the world’s largest and most successful firms are multinationals, with corporate 
expansions into foreign markets continuing to experience significant increases over time. For instance, 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTD) reports that the 100 largest 
corporations worldwide in 2013 had 65% of their sales and 59% of their assets in foreign markets. 
Moreover, global foreign direct investments (FDI) rose by 9% to $1.45 trillion in 2013, and this surge 
in FDI was expected to continue to about $1.8 trillion in 2016.1 This growth in FDI, often via foreign 
mergers and acquisitions (UNCTD, 2014), has at least two important implications: (i) many existing 
multinational corporations (MNCs) are expanding their foreign operations; and/or (ii) some domestic 
corporations (DCs) are growing into becoming multinationals. These developments, perhaps, 
underscore the continuing relevance of questioning the value implications of a firm’s multinationality. 
That is, does a firm’s degree of foreign involvement create higher value for shareholders? 
With corporate investments, particularly mergers and acquisitions (M&As), being a major source 
of value creation (or destruction) for shareholders (see Bick et al., 2017; Humphery-Jenner and Powell, 
2011; Goergen and Renneboog, 2004), the current study seeks to contribute to the body of research that 
links corporate multinationality and firm value by examining the impact of multinationality on M&A 
returns. Specifically, we relate both short-run and long-run M&A returns to the extent of foreign 
business activity of the acquiring firms. We refer to any observed association between M&A 
performance and the degree of foreign involvement as the multinationality effect (premium or discount). 
The UK offers an interesting setting for the study not just because it has a reasonable number of 
multinational corporations (MNCs) to permit a robust statistical analysis, but also because it has a 
vibrant market for corporate control, which allows most firms to expand via M&As. Conyon et al. 
(2018), for instance, report that the UK holds a top position in Europe for both outward and inward 
M&As, and is second only to the US worldwide.  
Theoretically, corporate multinationality can have positive as well as negative effects on the 
performance of M&As. While the acquisitions by both MNCs and non-MNCs are subject to many of 
the same influences and motivations, theory suggests that acquisitions by MNCs may present 
opportunities (costs) for value creation (destruction) that are different from those faced by non-MNCs. 
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For example, international business theory (specifically, internalization of market imperfections) 
suggests that MNCs can create synergies and competitive advantage from their special 
(intangible/proprietary) assets and organisational competencies arising from their differentiated 
products, superior innovations and managerial and/or marketing abilities (Park et al., 2013; Kogut and 
Chang, 1991). With such superior competencies and proprietary assets, MNCs can exploit differences 
in product and factor markets, international taxation, and financial markets to extract higher rent from 
their investments.  
Within the context of M&As, MNCs which are characterised by boards of directors with valuable 
foreign network and experience (Conyon et al., 2018) may be expected to use their 
expertise/competencies to select targets/deals that are more value-enhancing. This could be particularly 
so in cross-border M&A deals, where the directors’ foreign network and knowledge in foreign business 
operations could enhance the choice of suitable targets in foreign nations. Similarly, since MNCs tend 
to be larger organisations, they are more likely to be frequent (multiple) acquirers, and thus, possess 
greater acquisition experience and ability to negotiate value-enhancing deals. Aktas, de Bodt and Roll 
(2011) note that managers learn during the process of making multiple acquisitions, which can help 
them to better negotiate new deals, as well as competently integrate and manage merged firms. To the 
extent that MNCs are multiple acquirers with superior acquisition experience, they can achieve a 
premium in their acquisition activities (both domestic and foreign acquisitions).  
Alternatively, agency theory suggests a multinationality discount – the difficulty in monitoring 
managers internationally and the weak governance structures in many host countries (especially in less 
developed economies) may facilitate value-destroying investments by MNCs (Yang et al., 2017; 
Doukas and Pantzalis, 2003). This suggests that MNCs face additional costs due to higher agency and 
information costs in locations that are culturally and geographically distant, as well as an increased 
difficulty in the management and coordination of operations across disparate national borders (Bick et 
al., 2017; Hennart, 1991). Given the potential impact that M&As can have on the size and complexity 
of a firm, acquisitions by MNCs (which are often large entities) may be viewed by investors as non-
value-enhancing transactions that only add to the existing complex organisational structures of MNCs, 
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and perhaps only benefit corporate executives. Thus, M&As by MNCs could lead to a multinationality 
discount.  
Ultimately, the existence of a multinationality effect (premium or discount) in M&As remains an 
open empirical issue to be resolved by empirical research, and in this paper, we aim to provide important 
evidence in that regard. Moreover, our study contributes to the large literature on the value 
consequences of global diversification, the results for which are largely mixed. For example, Denis et 
al. (2002) find a negative impact of global diversification on firm value, whilst Dastidar (2009) and 
Ahmed and Elshandidy (2018) report a positive impact of global diversification on firm value. Focusing 
on the value implications through leverage, Park et al. (2013) find no significant impact of global 
diversification on firm value. The focus of analysis in most past studies has typically been on whether 
multinationality (or global diversification) increases or reduces overall firm value. While information 
on the impact of corporate multinationality on overall firm value is important, it is equally useful to 
obtain insights into the specific strategic decisions and actions that may contribute to the 
multinationality premium (or discount). In this regard, we rely on the unique environment provided by 
M&As to examine how MNCs’ expansions via M&As (both domestic and cross-border) may contribute 
to the overall multinationality premium (or discount) documented in prior studies. 
While we may not be the first to investigate the value of global diversification in the M&A context, 
our study makes important extensions by focusing on the level of multinationality of the acquiring firm 
prior to initiating the M&A transaction. Thus, we do not merely consider whether the focal acquisition 
increases the firm’s global scope, (i.e., the value implications of cross-border vs. domestic M&As), as 
in studies such as Gregory and O’Donohoe (2014) and Conn et al. (2005). Such analysis implicitly 
presume that investors may, for example, value cross-border M&As by an established MNC similarly 
as they would value cross-border acquisitions by a non-MNC. It is plausible to expect valuation 
differentials in those acquisitions, given the inherent differences in the nature (or perhaps ability) of the 
acquirers. Accordingly, our approach emphasises the nature (multinationality) of the firm prior to the 
merger, which then allows us to further examine which acquisition strategy (i.e., cross-border vs. 
domestic) delivers greater value for MNCs.    
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It is also suggested that corporate multinationality is valuable so long as there are segmented 
markets with entry barriers, and/or a difficulty in accessing and interpreting information across national 
borders (Aybar and Ficici, 2009; Doukas and Travlos, 1988). Therefore, given the reductions in trade 
and financial market imperfections (Banerji et al., 2018), and the increased amount of common 
knowledge available to all firms (through improved ICT environment) over time, we additionally 
examine the relations between multinationality and acquisition returns over time. The increased 
liberalisation and integration of markets across the globe has potentially reduced the competitive 
advantages enjoyed by MNCs from their proprietary assets. Similarly, the digital information age, 
witnessed in the late 1990s, has increased information retrieval and sharing over the internet, benefiting 
investors in the form of reduced information asymmetry and its associated agency (monitoring) costs 
(Bick et. al., 2017). We, therefore, expect the multinationality premium (or discount) to change over 
time.  
Our results, based on a dataset of over 6,000 M&As by UK (domestic and multinational) firms and 
multivariate regressions suggest the existence of an average multinationality premium of between 1.3% 
to 2.7% in announcement period cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), depending on the event window 
and the multinationality measure utilised in the analysis. That is, the M&As announced by firms with 
greater involvement in foreign business earn significantly higher CARs, after controlling for firm-, 
industry, and year-fixed effects, as well as the known firm- and deal-factors that influence acquisition 
returns. Additionally, results based on long-run operating performance point to a multinationality 
premium. These results largely support the view that global diversification is, on average, value-
enhancing. Moreover, we find that despite there being less trade barriers and increased global financial 
markets integration in recent years, the value of corporate multinationality persists over time, with later 
years (2000-2014) earning as much premium as the earlier sample period (1987-1999).  Finally, we 
provide evidence to suggest that the multinationality premium in M&A returns is restricted to foreign 
acquisitions into advanced countries by firms with superior resource/managerial capabilities and lower 
agency costs.   
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: the next section explores the potential reasons why 
M&A returns may systematically vary with the degree of corporate multinationality. It also briefly 
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reviews the M&A literature, focussing on the key determinants of acquirer returns. Section 3 describes 
the data, sample characteristics and methodology. Section 4 presents and discusses the empirical results, 
Section 5 conducts robustness analysis, and the final section concludes the paper.  
 
2. RELATED LITERATURE 
(i) Why would a multinationality effect (premium or discount) exist in M&As?   
Both the resource-based theory of strategic management and the internalisation theory of 
international business imply that there could be a multinationality premium in M&A returns. From a 
resource-based perspective, Teece et al. (1997) and Barney (1991) contend that when firms are 
heterogeneous with respect to their resources/capabilities/endowments, a firm’s internal competencies 
and capabilities relating to technological assets, organisational processes/systems, and managerial 
skills/abilities, become fundamental drivers of wealth creation for the firm. Similarly, Park et al. (2013) 
and Prahalad and Hamel (1990) highlight firm resource heterogeneity and immobility as a possible 
source of competitive advantage for firms. They argue that if differences exist in the strategic resources 
that firms control, and these resources are not perfectly mobile across firms, those firms endowed with 
valuable resources/capabilities/competencies are able to implement value-creating strategies that cannot 
be easily implemented by any of their current or potential competitors who do not possess such 
capabilities.  
In fact, existing research in international business and organisational learning directly suggest a 
differential in the organisational resources and capabilities of MNCs and DCs. The internalization 
theory, for example, posits that MNCs possess certain valuable intangible assets (e.g., technological 
know-how effective, experienced and dedicated management) which can be exploited to increase their 
value (Buckley et al., 2014; Morck and Yeung, 1992). For most MNCs, a potential source of their 
capabilities is the better business knowledge and experience fostered by learning from the diversity in 
foreign market environments in which they operate (Iliev and Roth, 2018; Aktas et al., 2011). Overall, 
combining the resource-based theory with the internalization theory suggests that MNCs should, on 
average, enjoy competitive advantage from their special (intangible) resources and competencies, and 
can leverage this advantage to earn a premium in their M&A activities.  
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While the opportunities and challenges associated with M&As may be similar for MNCs and non-
MNCs, it is likely that the differences in their resource endowments and organisational capabilities can 
lead to performance variations. A more specific and plausible reason as to why firms with higher foreign 
exposure may be associated with a higher acquisition return is their ability to employ and retain quality 
management teams. Due to the size/resource advantage of MNCs, they can attract top managers from 
across the globe, who are experienced in negotiating and successfully completing acquisitions 
(Miletkov et al., 2017; Masulis and Mobbs, 2014). Conyon et al. (2018) and Iliev and Roth (2018) 
suggest that managerial foreign experience, emanating from specialised foreign expertise and foreign 
networks, are more valuable to firms than general managerial skills which may be common to all firms. 
Similarly, Miletkov et al. (2017) show that non-US firms that add foreign directors to their boards 
benefit if the directors come from countries with higher governance standards (i.e., the firm “imports” 
better governance). The authors further report that firms with foreign directors can obtain more positive 
wealth effects at acquisition announcements. Furthermore, Estélyi and Nisar (2016) report a 
significantly positive association between boards containing foreign nationals and firms’ international 
market operations and their operating performance. Therefore, to the extent that managerial acquisition 
experience and foreign expertise are higher in MNCs, a multinationality premium in M&A returns may 
arise, at least in cross-border acquisitions where such expertise are paramount. For instance, the foreign 
directors in MNCs can rely on their foreign network to identify suitable overseas’ targets and negotiate 
value-enhancing cross-border deals.  
Beyond superior managerial foreign experience and network, MNCs may, in general, possess more 
acquisition experience than their non-MNC counterparts since larger firms tend to be multiple acquirers 
(Aktas et al., 2011). Given that managers experientially learn from their previous acquisition deals, and 
thus make better subsequent acquisitions (Aktas et al., 2011), we expect MNCs, particularly when they 
are frequent acquirers, to experience higher acquisition returns.  
Collectively, the positive direct effect on M&A performance of MNCs occurs when the associated 
valuable resources/competencies (e.g., managerial know-how and network, as well as acquisition 
experience) make it possible to select suitable targets, manage new deals, and avoid pre- and post-
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acquisition mistakes and challenges. These factors are expected to lead to increased probability of M&A 
success for MNCs, and thereby result in a multinationality premium in M&A returns.1  
So far, our discussions predict the existence of a multinationality premium in the performance of 
M&As. However, diversification (in general) is not a guaranteed route to success. Both industrial and 
geographic diversifications come at a cost. If the cost of geographic diversification is too large to offset 
the benefits discussed above, then we will expect a multinationality discount or at best an insignificant 
multinationality effect. A major diversification cost is suggested by the agency theory which posits that 
managers may expand across borders for personal gains. That is, managers may follow a strategy of 
“empire-building” to increase their compensation, entrenchment, power and prestige associated with 
managing a larger firm (Jensen, 1986; Harford et al., 2012). Such self-interested management actions 
thrive when it is difficult to monitor the managers. And since higher opacity associated with globally 
diversified firm makes it is more difficult to monitor them (Aabo et al., 2015), managers of MNCs are 
more likely to be self-interested and engage in M&A transactions that benefit them at the expense of 
shareholders.    
To prevent self-interested managers from making expropriations, investors of MNCs need to incur 
bonding and monitoring costs (agency/governance costs), such as auditing fees (Jensen and Meckling, 
1979) if they are to avoid value-decreasing acquisitions. Overall, the higher agency costs associated 
with MNCs could offset at least part of the multinationality advantages, and where these costs are 
substantial, they can even lead to a multinationality discount in M&A returns.  
Taken together, in theory, there are important reasons to expect a multinationality premium or 
discount in M&A returns depending on the strength of the benefits and costs associated with a firm’s 
multinationality. Of course, a third possibility exists where the multinationality costs completely 
neutralise the benefits, resulting in a statistically insignificant relation between multinationality and 
acquisition performance. In the end, whether a multinationality effect exists in practice remains an 
unanswered empirical issue, to which this paper attempts to address.   
                                                          
1Pre-acquisition challenges and mistakes include the over-valuation of the target company and the difficulty to 
assess the value of the resources possessed by the target company. Post-acquisition challenges include the strategic 





(ii) M&A returns to acquirers 
The empirical evidence on the performance effect of M&As is extensive and mixed. In general, the 
literature concludes that M&As increase the value of target firms, while the outcome is less clear for 
acquiring firms (see Andrade et al., 2001). Most studies find that acquisitions reduce firm value for 
acquirers or do not exert any significant impact at all (Bick et al., 2017; Moeller et al., 2004; Andrade 
et al., 2001). However, some other studies find that acquisitions can create value for acquirers (Yang et 
al., 2017; Humphery-Jenner and Powell, 2011; Martynova and Renneboog, 2008). Value creation in 
M&As for acquirers is generally attributed to the features of the deal, as well as the characteristics of 
the involved firms. This literature on the determinants of acquirer M&A returns is generally well-known 
and we do not repeat it here, except to note the commonly cited factors prior to focusing on the limited 
literature on the acquisition returns for MNCs that has particular implications for the current article. 
On the deal characteristics, there is evidence for positive impact on acquirer performance for 
industry relatedness, hostility, cash payment, private targets, and deal size (see e.g., Yang et al., 2017; 
Harford et al., 2012; Conn et al., 2005; Moeller et al., 2004) while negative effect of some of these deal 
characteristics are also reported in other studies such as Aybar and Ficici (2009) and Humphery-Jenner 
and Powell (2011). Another strand of the M&A literature has highlighted the impact of the target nation 
on acquirer returns. Conn et al. (2005) directly compare cross-border with domestic acquisitions, and 
find that in cross-border acquisitions returns are significantly lower. Contrary evidence is, however, 
reported by Feito-Ruiz and Menendez-Requejo (2011) based on 469 European mergers completed 
during 2002-2006. They find shareholders of acquiring firms to gain more in cross-border acquisitions 
(which often increase the firms’ level of multinationality) than on domestic ones. They further show 
that the stronger the legal and institutional environment of the acquirer’s country in comparison with 
that of the target firm’s country, the more positive the effect on acquirers’ gains. Martynova and 
Renneboog (2008) analyse European mergers during 1993-2001 and find that acquiring firms obtain 
more positive abnormal returns in cross-border deals. So far, findings from studies on the cross-border 
M&A effect on acquirers’ wealth seem mixed, necessitating further research into the relations between 
geographic diversification and M&A returns from different perspectives.        
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When it comes to the impact of the acquirers’ characteristics on their M&A returns, varying features 
ranging from acquirer’s size, cash flows, Tobin’s q, leverage, management quality, and experience have 
been considered in several prior research (see e.g., Yang et al., 2017; Golubov et al., 2015; Moeller et 
al., 2004). Yang et al. (2017) find acquirer returns to increase with cash flow, leverage, and Tobin’s q. 
In line with managerial opportunism, hubris, and agency arguments, there is amble evidence that 
acquirers’ returns are negatively impacted by firm size, free cash flow, and Tobin’s q (Golubov et al., 
2015; Moeller et al., 2004). Further, it has been shown that business and M&A experience can improve 
M&A performance via learning from a firm’s own past experiences and/or learning from peers (Aktas 
et al., 2011; Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998).  
Golubov, Yawson, and Zhang (2015) contribute to the literature on the sources of acquirer returns 
by noting that most of the suggested explanations based on deal and firm features are relatively 
unsuccessful at explaining significant amounts of total acquirer returns, with regressions having R2s in 
the range of 5% to 6%. Rather, they find firm-fixed effects to explain significant proportions of the 
variations in acquirer returns. Golubov et al. (2015) conclude that firms have attributes that either allow 
them to benefit from synergies with their targets or they have special skills at valuing potential targets. 
The current paper relates to, as well as extends the work of Golubov et al. (2015) by examining whether 
the specific attributes of MNCs (e.g., managerial quality) make them better acquirers who consistently 
earn higher acquisition returns.  
Few M&A empirical studies have investigated the announcement period returns for multinational 
acquirers. Aybar and Ficici (2009) examine the value implications of 433 cross-border M&As of 
emerging-market MNCs during 1991-2004. They report that, on average, cross-border expansions of 
emerging-market MNCs through acquisitions do not create value but point to value destructions for 
more than half of the transactions analysed. Using 301 cross-border M&As by US firms over the period 
1975-1983, Doukas and Travlos (1988) they find MNCs not initially operating in the target’s country 
to experience significant positive share price movements upon the announcement of the acquisition. 
They, however, show that the announcement return is insignificantly positive if the acquirer is 
expanding internationally for the first time. Their results, though dated, suggest that multinationality 
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may be valuable when firms possess general international business experience, but are new to a 
particular foreign market.  
A common feature of these related studies is their exclusion of domestic acquisitions from their 
analysis, and thus, presuming that the special resources and capabilities of MNCs have no implications 
on their domestic expansions. Moreover, these studies made little or no attempt to isolate the effect of 
the geographic scope (MNC vs. DC) of the acquiring firm on the outcome of the M&A. We fill these 
gaps by directly relating both short-run and long-run acquisition returns to acquirers’ pre-acquisition 
level of multinationality. Our relatively large sample of over 6,000 acquisition deals (domestic and 
cross-border) over the 1987-2014 period permits us not just to establish the presence or otherwise of a 
multinationality effect in M&A returns, but to ascertain how the multinationality effect (if any) has 
changed over time and under what conditions the multinationality effect thrives. Finally, we adopt 
econometric procedures (Heckman selection model) that are robust to sample selection bias since firms 
select themselves into the MNCs and DC sub-samples. 
 
3. METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
(i) Methodology  
A primary objective of this paper is to investigate the relationship between a firm’s multinationality 
and its acquisition returns. Thus, our empirical approach is to regress various measures of acquisition 
returns on proxies of corporate multinationality and a set of control variables. In an alternative approach, 
we directly compare the returns from MNCs’ expansion via M&As with those of non-MNCs. However, 
the underlying characteristics that drive the firm’s decision to diversify internationally may also impact 
its investment returns and firm value (Dastidar, 2009). So, if firms choose to diversify internationally, 
a proper evaluation of the multinationality premium (discount) would be incomplete without 
considering the underlying characteristics that influence the decision to either become multinational or 
remain domestic. Failure to control for the underlying characteristics driving this decision will wrongly 
attribute the impact on the M&A performance to multinationality rather than the underlying 
characteristics. Therefore, we explicitly control for self-selection using the Heckman selection model 
(see Choi et al., 2014; Lennox et al., 2012; Dastidar, 2009).     
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The Heckman (1979) two-step estimation procedure is appropriate in this context because it allows 
us to estimate firm’s M&A return, while controlling for the decision to diversify. In the first-stage probit 
regression (see Appendix A1), the dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value of one if the firm 
is a MNC and zero otherwise. Following the extant literature (e.g., Yang et al., 2017; Choi et al., 2014), 
we control for several firm-, industry-, and country-level variables that could affect firms’ decision to 
diversify globally. These variables (defined in Appendix A2) include firm size, leverage, intangibles, 
Tobin’s q, cash ratio, age, product diversification, current ratio, R&D intensity, inflation, and industry 
MNC ratio.2  
Although the nonlinearity of the Mills ratio makes the Mills coefficient technically identifiable 
even without the imposition of exclusion restrictions (Lennox et al., 2012), it is recommended that at 
least one variable should be included in the first-stage (probit) model that can be excluded from the 
second-stage (M&A returns) regression. Accordingly, we rely on several variables including product 
diversification, current ratio, R&D intensity, inflation, and industry MNC ratio for the exclusion 
restriction. We expect these exclusion variables to be positively correlated with firms’ decision to 
become multinational (Choi et al., 2014), but not necessarily (directly) related to the acquisition returns 
of individual firms.3 For instance, while the concentration of MNCs in an industry (proxied by industry 
MNC ratio) is unlikely to influence the profitability of an individual firm’s acquisition return, it is 
plausible for a firm operating in an industry dominated by MNCs to decide to become multinational 
(Choi et al., 2014).  
We also control for year- and industry-dummies in the first-stage probit regression. The first-stage 
probit regression yields a propensity score of the decision to diversify globally, which is then used to 
estimate a self-correction variable, lambda ( ), corresponding to the inverse Mills ratio. This   is then 
                                                          
2In estimating the first-stage probit model, it is more appropriate to utilise firm-level variables prevailing at the 
time a DC transitioned to become a MNC. However, we are unable to identify the transition years for most of the 
MNCs in our sample, causing us to lose almost 20% of data when we apply this (desirable) approach. Therefore, 
we only apply this approach in our robustness analysis in Section 5 and use the firm-level variables in the pre-
acquisition years for the main analysis. As shown in Appendix A1 and Table 8, the results based on both 
approaches [i.e., pre-acquisition variables (full sample) and pre-MNC transition (reduced sample)] are 
qualitatively similar.  
3Appendix A1 and results in Models 5-6 of Table 9 provide empirical evidence in support of this claim with 
respect to the use of product diversification as an exclusion variable. 
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included in the second-stage regression in Eq. (1) to correct for endogeneity. Without this correction, 
the standard OLS regression model would compare MNCs and non-MNCs under the assumption that 
MNCs constitute a random sample of all firms in the database (Lennox et al., 2012). 
The baseline (second-stage) regression model utilised in this paper has the following structure:  𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 + 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝑓𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜆 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡          Eq. (1) 
where 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑡 is the M&A returns for firm i in year t, measured as: (i) short-run announcement period 
returns; (ii) long-run operating performance; or (iii) long-run buy-and-hold abnormal returns. The 
announcement returns cover cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the (-1, +1), (-2, +2), and (-5, +5) 
event windows. We follow the standard event study methodology (see, Barbopoulos et al., 2012) to 
compute the abnormal returns (ARs) and CARs by subtracting the daily return for the FTSE All-Share 
stock market index from the acquiring firm’s daily stock return over the relevant event window. Thus, 
the CARs reflect the view of the market participants of the quality of the M&A deal.  
For the long-run operating performance, we adopt a procedure similar to Arena and Dewally 
(2017) and measure it as the difference between the return on assets (ROA) for the three years following 
the acquisition and the ROA for the three years before the acquisition (i.e., ROA). The ROA is the 
earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) divided by total assets. We 
further follow procedures in Minnick, Unal and Yang (2011) to compute a long-run stock-based 
performance measure, buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR), as the difference between the three-year 
post-acquisition buy-and-hold returns of the acquirer and that of the benchmark portfolio.4 The use of 
the three-year windows increases the likelihood of capturing post-acquisition returns since it may take 
several years for an acquirer to fully integrate a target (Minnick et al., 2011).5 In line with standard 
                                                          
4Note that the long-run performance measure based on BHAR is, by definition, relative to the benchmark portfolio, 
and impliedly a different measure from that of the long-run operating performance. Hence, although we industry-
adjust both performance measures, the two could capture different salient features of acquisition performance. 
5The three-year window, however, poses a challenge to properly isolating the merger effect where there are 
multiple acquirers. We mitigate this problem by controlling for multiple acquirers in the regressions. Moreover, 
in untabulated results, we adopt two additional approaches to deal with this challenge. First, we eliminate multiple 
acquirers and conduct the analysis only for single acquirers. Next, we only consider the first acquisition of the 
multiple acquirer completed within a year, as in Minnick et al. (2011). Employing these additional approaches 
did not change our main findings and conclusions.   
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practice (see Yang et al., 2017; Minnick et al., 2011), the long-run performance measures are adjusted 
by the performance of the industry median firm to mitigate the effect of secular changes in performance.  
The independent variable of interest is 𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 and it is measured one year before the 
focal acquisition was announced. Depending on the specified model, multinationality is defined as 
either a continuous variable or a dummy. Following Aabo et al. (2015), the continuous variable for 
multinationality is measured as the ratio of foreign sales to total sales. Park et al. (2013) contend that 
since the continuous variable utilises more fine-grained information, it can be a better measure of 
multinationality than a dummy. Thus, the foreign sales ratio becomes our main measure of 
multinationality. For robustness, we also create a multinationality dummy that takes the value of one if 
a firm’s foreign sales ratio is at least 50% and takes zero otherwise. The 50% foreign sales threshold 
for the definition of multinationality is consistent with Aabo et al. (2015) and Park et al. (2013), and is 
chosen to ensure that firms classified as multinationals are truly firms with significant foreign 
operations. Beside serving as an alternative measure of multinationality, the multinationality dummy 
helps us to observe the impact of extreme multinationality (i.e., highly MNCs) on acquisition returns.  
The coefficient on the multinationality variable ( 1 ) in Eq. (1) shows the impact of 
multinationality on the performance of M&As after controlling for other known factors and 
endogeneity. A positive (negative) and significant value of 1 will denote the existence of a 
multinationality premium (discount) in M&A returns that go beyond the underlying characteristics of 
the acquiring firms and the deal. The vector itX controls for other firm-specific factors and deal 
characteristics that are likely to influence M&A returns. These controls, defined in Appendix A2, 
include acquiring firm’s size, Tobin’s q, liquidity, leverage, intangibles, age, and acquisition 
experience. Deal characteristics such as the target firm being foreign, bankrupt, or public are also 
controlled for. We also control for whether the target is in a high-tech industry or operates in the same 
4-digit-SIC industry as the acquirer. Other controls include means of payment for the deal (cash and 
equity), the duration for completing the deal, the relative size of the deal to the bidder’s size, and 
whether the bid was hostile. We also include dummies to control for firm-, industry- and year-fixed 
effects, which are 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚, 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 and 𝑓𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟, respectively. The industry dummies are expected to control 
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for industry demands and factors, while the year dummies capture economy-wide shocks such as merger 
waves, recessions, market bubbles, etc. The firm-fixed effect account for the possibility that some firms 
are persistently better acquirers than others (Golubov et al., 2015). Finally, the model includes an 
intercept ( 0 ) and an error term ( it ). To mitigate the impact of outliers on the regression estimates, 
all continuous variables are winzorised at 1%. 
  
(ii) Data collection and sample description 
We examine all M&As (domestic and cross-border) by UK firms over the period 1987-2014. The 
cut-off point for the sample period was influenced by the requirement for the long-run M&A 
performance measures ( ROA and BHAR) to be observed for the three years before and after the 
completion of the deal. We exclude deals by governments and their agencies, healthcare, financial, and 
utility firms since they are not profit-oriented or are subject to stricter regulations. The data for M&As 
and deal characteristics are drawn from the Thomson Financial Securities Data Corporation’s (SDC) 
database. We then require that the acquirer has available stock prices and relevant accounting 
information as well as segment-level data on foreign sales from Datastream. To capture deals that are 
likely to create excitement in the market, we further require the acquirer to have less than 10% of initial 
stake in the target and seek to own more than 50% of the target after the transaction.6 Applying these 
filters leave us with a final sample of 6,022 M&As over the 1987-2014 period by UK firms, comprising 
1,523 acquisitions by multinational firms and 4,499 acquisitions by non-MNCs. 
Table 1 presents the distribution of the sample by year, degree of multinationality, and industry. 
Our sample period can be spilt into almost two equal parts – early years (1984-1999), constituting 49% 
of the sample; and recent years (2000-2014) making up the remaining 51%. The early periods are 
characterised by little global integration relative to the recent years, which permits us to examine 
whether the value of multinationality changed over time in response to the extent of global 
economic/financial market integration. Table 1 also clearly displays the increasing trend of corporate 
multinationality, with the proportion of MNCs rising from 20% in 1990 to 45% in 2011. In terms of 
                                                          
6We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion. 
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industry, the consumer goods and industrial firms have the topmost representations; 30% and 26%, 
respectively. The industry with the least representation is telecommunications (2%), followed by retail 
(8%). 
[INSERT TABLE 1] 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the sample. The average firm in our sample generates over 
a quarter of its sales from overseas (26%). The standard deviations for the foreign sales ratio and 
multinationality dummy are 30% and 43% respectively, indicating a significant variability in our 
multinationality measures. Except for ROA, it seems acquisitions by our sample firms are, on average, 
seen by investors to be value-enhancing since their announcements correspond with positive market 
reactions of between 1.17% and 9.5%. A comparison of the acquisition returns for our subsamples of 
MNCs and non-MNCs in Table 2 reveals no statistically significant difference between them, except 
for the BHAR which shows returns to be significantly higher for MNCs. Thus, our initial univariate 
analysis of acquisition returns (except for BHAR) largely suggests the absence of a multinationality 
effect (i.e., M&As by MNCs perform as well as those undertaken by their domestic counterparts). 
[INSERT TABLE 2] 
It is important to highlight that these preliminary results do not control for endogeneity and other 
known firm- and deal-specific features that can influence M&A returns. This is particularly important 
when the firm- and deal-level variables shown in Table 2 clearly suggest significant differences between 
MNCs and non-MNCs. Relative to the other firms, MNCs tend to be older, larger, and more experienced 
acquirers. They also have larger cash balances and intangible assets, as well as better growth prospects. 
These statistics suggest that MNCs may possess superior resources and capabilities that can be tapped 
in generating higher acquisition returns.  
In terms of the features of the deal, MNCs seem to have a higher propensity to choose targets from 
foreign countries, from outside their own industries, and from high-tech (i.e., fast-growing) industries. 
Further, MNCs appear to have appetite for cash deals and listed (public) targets, which tend to be 
associated with lower information asymmetry problems and a lesser mispricing risk. MNCs also tend 
to avoid bankrupt targets as well as relatively larger targets that are likely to pose post-merger 
integration problems. Finally, the governance variables (board network and independence) indicate that 
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MNCs are likely to have better top management who can deliver successful acquisitions. Overall, the 
univariate analysis from Table 2 suggests that MNCs may be associated with superior internal 
capabilities, including quality board of directors who are able to select targets and negotiate deals that 
deliver acquisition premium. This largely support our argument in Section 2.  
We present correlation matrix in Table 3, which supports the relations between multinationality 
and the firm and deal characteristics in Table 2. Table 3 also shows a strong association between our 
multinationality measures – foreign asset ratio and MNC dummy – with a coefficient of 0.87. There is, 
however, very little correlation between the short-run announcement returns and the long-run 
acquisition returns (up to 0.06), indicating that they may be capturing different aspects of the 
performance of the acquisition. There is also a mixed and largely insignificant correlation between the 
acquisition returns and the multinationality measures. Perhaps, this underscores the need for a robust 
test in a multivariate framework that takes care of endogeneity concerns. Finally, multicolinearlity is 
unlikely to pose serious limitations on our multivariate regressions in the next section since the 
correlations among the explanatory variables are generally low, with the highest being the correlation 
between firm size and board independence (0.53). 
[INSERT TABLE 3] 
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
This section applies the previously discussed methodology to the sample of acquisitions by MNCs 
and non-MNCs. First, we examine whether multinationality is associated with an acquisition premium 
or discount. We then delve deeper into establishing whether the multinationality effect, if any, has 
changed over time. We further explore potential explanations for the multinationality effect. 
 
(i) Is there a multinationality premium (discount) in M&A returns?  
We begin our multivariate analysis with OLS regressions without considering the endogeneity of 
the decision to diversify internationally. Thus, Models 1 to 6 of Table 4 present results from estimation 
of Eq. (1), but without lambda ( ). The dependent variables in Models 1 to 6 are announcement period 
returns for the 3-day (-1, +1), 5-day (-2, +2), and 11-day (-5, +5) windows around the announcement of 
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the bid. The results provide evidence for the presence of a statistically significant multinationality 
premium in M&A announcement returns. Specifically, in Models 1, 3, and 5, the coefficient on the 
foreign sales ratio is positive and significant, suggesting that greater foreign exposure/involvement is 
associated with an average of 2.2%-2.7% announcement period returns. The multinationality premium 
is observed after controlling for several known firm and deal characteristics. These results imply that 
investors value M&A deals by firms with greater foreign involvement more than those by other firms 
(i.e., MNCs’ expansions via acquisitions create greater value for acquiring firms’ shareholders). The 
results continue to hold, with premiums of 1.3% to 2.3% and significant at the 1% level, when 
multinationality is measured by an indicator variable – MNC dummy (see Models 2, 4, and 6).  
[INSERT TABLE 4] 
Prior to discussing our results further, we control for the endogeneity of the diversification decision 
using the Heckman procedures discussed in the methodology section. These results are reported in 
Models 7 to 12 of Table 4. According to this set of results, the endogeneity of the diversification 
decision has no material impact on the relations between multinationality and announcement period 
returns. All, but one of the parameter estimates for the multinationality effect remain significantly 
positive and of a similar magnitude as in the OLS regressions. Moreover, the coefficients for the inverse 
Mills ratio ( ), the correction for self-selection, are all statistically insignificant, indicating that the 
decision to become a multinational or remain domestic does not influence the announcement returns 
from an acquisition. That is, the endogeneity associated with becoming multinational is unlikely to pose 
serious econometric challenges to our results.  Therefore, we rely more on our OLS findings in 
subsequent analysis involving announcement returns. This is particularly important since the difficulty 
in obtaining valid instruments for the Heckman model could undermine its results (Lennox et al., 2012). 
Moreover, we lose some observations (almost 10%) under Heckman specifications due to additional 
variable requirements. 
Collectively, after controlling for the several factors that influence M&A performance, as well as 
the factors that induce self-selection, there seem to be a multinationality premium in M&A 
announcement returns. This finding implies that the benefits of being a MNC outweigh the costs, at 
least in terms of M&A investments. It appears that MNCs can leverage their superior 
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resources/competencies/capabilities to create competitive advantage in selecting suitable acquisition 
targets and in integrating, as well as managing those acquired targets. Thus, the evidence in this paper 
contradicts the geographic diversification discount literature (e.g., Denis et al., 2002), but is in line with 
the view of superior performance by MNCs relative to DCs (Criscuolo and Martin, 2009). Criscuolo 
and Martin (2009) examine differences in productivity between foreign-owned plants and domestic-
owned plants for a UK sample. They find that foreign-owned plants have higher productivity than 
domestic plants.  
Turning to the control variables, some variables (namely; cash ratio, intangibles, foreign target, hi-
tech target, bankrupt target, multiple acquirer, cash deal, stock deal, hostile deal, and completion days) 
do not appear to exert any significant influence on announcement returns. Other variables such as firm 
size, Tobin’s q, leverage, related target, and public target mostly impact acquisition returns significantly 
negatively, while a significantly positive impact is largely observed for acquirer’s firm age and the 
relative size of the deal to the acquirer’s size. Most of these variables have signs that are consistent with 
prior findings in Yang et al. (2017), Gregory and O’Donohoe (2014), Bae et al. (2013), Barbopoulos et 
al. (2012) and Masulis et al., (2007). 
 
(ii) Does the multinationality premium persist in the long-run and over time? 
Thus far, we have shown that acquirers with higher foreign operations have better abnormal returns 
around acquisition announcements, and that multinationality seems to promote (reduce) the likelihood 
of value-enhancing (value-reducing) acquisitions. In this section, we analyse changes in acquirers’ 
performance following the acquisitions (i.e., long-run returns) to examine whether the positive reaction 
on the stock market can be justified by real economic gains from the acquisitions.  
Studies on the long-run performance of acquirers provide mixed results. Based on buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns, Dutta and Jog (2009) do not show any significant long-term abnormal returns for 
acquiring firms, while Yang et al. (2017) find acquirers to generally experience a decrease in operating 
performance. In contrast, Barbopoulos et al. (2012) show that the average acquirer gains 0.38% excess 
returns per month over a year, and that this gain is sustained over a period of five years. Furthermore, 
Minnick et al. (2011) show that well-governed firms (i.e., those with a higher pay-for-performance 
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sensitivity) display greater improvements in their operating performance following an acquisition. If, 
indeed, MNCs are better-governed through the presence of more diverse and independent boards, then 
we will expect the multinationality premium in announcement returns to persist in the long-run.  
We test this prediction in Models 1 to 8 of Table 5 (using both OLS and Heckman procedures) and 
find mixed results. While results based on operating performance (ROA) show that multinationality is 
associated with a significant acquisition premium of 1.8% to 3.9%, the stock-based performance 
measure (BHAR) suggest no significant difference in the long-run acquisition performance of MNCs 
and non-MNCs. Since long-run stock returns can be noisy due to the influence of numerous factors in 
addition to the acquisition itself (Minnick et al., 2011), we rely on the operating performance measure 
for any further analysis and in making inferences about the acquisition effect on long-run performance.   
[INSERT TABLE 5] 
Next, we examine whether the impact of multinationality on M&A returns shifts over time. Our 
expectation is that the multinationality effect should change over time because of increases in 
information sharing technology, a common international financial reporting framework, and a more 
integrated global economic/financial market. Bick et al. (2017) find increased information sharing and 
retrieval technology, as well as more standardised global financial reporting in recent years to have 
significantly reduced information asymmetry over their sample period: 1985-2014, leading to an 
elimination of the advantage possessed by informed acquirers when making acquisitions. Further, 
focusing on the extent to which a country’s financial market is integrated into the global financial 
markets, Francis et al. (2008) find both short-run abnormal returns and long-run operating performance 
for acquirers to be significantly higher when targets are from segmented financial markets than when 
targets are from integrated financial markets. Their results imply that global diversification may be less 
valuable when financial markets are more integrated, and shareholders can directly diversify their 
portfolios with little restrictions. Thus, we predict a reduced multinationality advantage in recent years, 
and hence, a diminished multinationality premium in M&As over our sample period.  
We find results inconsistent with this expectation of a weakened multinationality premium over 
time. As reported in Models 9 to 12 of Table 5, although the average multinationality effect remains 
significantly positive, the interaction terms between the multinationality measures and the indicator 
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variables for recent years (i.e., period 2; 2000-2014) are all insignificant across both the short-run and 
long-run models. This suggests that the recent multinationality premium earned by acquiring firms with 
greater foreign operations in recent years (2000-2014) is not significantly different from the returns 
earned in earlier years (1987-1999). These findings hold when the alternative acquisition returns (e.g., 
CAR -2, +2) are utilised, but these results are untabulated to conserve space. In summary, despite the 
increased integration of global markets coupled with increased information disclosures in recent years, 
multinational bidders still seem to possess an advantage in mergers and acquisitions, causing them to 
sustain the acquisition premium in recent years.                                                    
 
(iii) Multinationality premium: Potential sources 
In this section, we conduct further analysis to explore some potential explanations for the observed 
multinationality premium in acquisition returns. All the analysis in this section (reported in Table 6) 
has the 3-day abnormal returns as the dependent variable and the foreign sales ratio as the independent 
variable. The findings remain qualitatively similar when alternative performance and multinationality 
measures are employed but these are again unreported to save space. The analysis here is motivated by 
the notion that the multinationality premium may increase with firms’ capabilities/resources. It can also 
be argued that the multinationality premium increases when management is able to check agency 
problems.  
As discussed in Section 2, a potential source of multinationality premium is the presence of 
valuable organisational resources/capabilities such as managerial know-how (e.g., boards with foreign 
network and acquisition experience) associated with large MNCs. Large firms that typically engage in 
serial acquisitions tend to have in-house M&A committees that advice management on acquisition 
deals. Such internal capabilities of large multinationals can enhance (prevent) value-creating (value-
destroying) acquisitions through the selection of quality targets and the avoidance of post-integration 
problems. To the extent that these organisational capabilities are higher in larger, better-governed, and 
experienced firms (Miletkov et al., 2017; Conyon et al., 2018; and Iliev and Roth, 2018), we expect 
these firms to achieve greater multinationality premiums in M&A returns. Results in Models 1 to 6 of 
Table 6 support this conjecture. Specifically, significant multinationality premiums are observed in 
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larger firms, firms with higher board network, and for multiple acquirers, but not for other firms (i.e., 
small firms, firms with low board network, and single acquirers).  
[INSERT TABLE 6] 
Relatedly, the multinationality premium is likely to thrive if better-governed firms can minimize 
their agency problems by reducing discretionary cash-flow (Jensen, 1986) and enhancing managerial 
monitoring through quality audits (Ghafran and O’Sullivan, 2017). As can be seen from Models 7 to 10 
of Table 6, these arguments are supported by our findings. In particular, the multinationality premium 
only exists in firms with lower levels of agency costs, i.e., those with low free-cash flow ( 1 =0.039, 
p=0.011 in Model 8) and high audit quality ( 1 =0.022, p=0.009 in Model 9).    
We further examine in Table 7 whether the multinationality premium varies with the location of 
the target firm. First, we test in Models 1 to 2 whether the premium differs in foreign and domestic 
acquisitions and find the multinationality premium to be restricted to foreign acquisitions ( 1 =0.026, 
p=0.031 in Model 1). Though the multinationality premium is positive in domestic acquisitions, it lacks 
statistical significance at conventional levels ( 1 =0.017, p=0.120 in Model 2). These findings imply 
that multinationality becomes advantageous only in foreign (cross-border) acquisitions, which tend to 
be more complex, and where superior management with extensive foreign network and experience may 
be crucial. In untabulated results, we find that except for highly MNCs, the multinationality premium 
earned in foreign acquisitions is generally not significantly different from that of domestic acquisitions.7   
Finally, in Models 3 to 6 of Table 7, we investigate the role of geographic distance between the 
acquirer and target nations, as well as the role of the economic environment of the target firm in shaping 
the multinationality premium. Bick et al. (2017) and Agyei-Boapeah (2015) suggest that geographic 
distance and the economic environment of the target firm can influence acquisition returns. The results 
in Models 3 to 4 suggest that the premium prevails across both shorter and longer geographic distances 
(i.e., targets domiciled in the European Union and beyond), while Models 5 to 6 report premium only 
when the target is domiciled in an advanced economy (i.e. G-7 countries). The G-7 results may perhaps 
                                                          
7We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this analysis. 
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be because UK directors are more likely to have most of their foreign network from other G-7 countries 
and/or obtain their foreign work experience from other advanced countries, rather than from developing 
economies.   
Collectively, the evidence observed in this section suggests that the multinationality advantage in 
M&As is not symmetric across all firms and all deal types. Instead, the multinationality advantage is 
higher or perhaps restricted to foreign acquisitions into advanced economies by large, experienced firms 
with quality top management who can curb agency problems.   
[INSERT TABLE 7] 
 
5. ROBUSTNESS TESTINGS 
We undertake a raft of robustness tests in this section. First, we test whether an alternative 
modelling of our first-stage (probit) regression for our Heckman procedures affect our key conclusions. 
Here, we drop any MNC for which it was impossible to identify its year of transition from DC to MNC. 
We then estimate the probit regression based on control variables constructed in the pre-transition year. 
As shown in Appendix A1, the probit regression result based on this restriction is similar to that without 
imposing this condition. More importantly, our key finding of a multinationality premium in M&As is 
robust to the imposition of this pre-transition condition (see Models 1 to 4 of Table 8).  
Second, several studies suggest that corporate governance arrangements including board 
independence, board external network and board diversity, among others, can influence corporate 
outcomes such as acquisitions (e.g., Iliev and Roth, 2018; Masulis and Mobbs, 2014; Masulis et al., 
2007). It is, therefore, important to control for corporate governance in our regression model. To do 
this, we merge our sample to governance data collected from BoardEx database, but unfortunately, we 
lose considerable amount (66%) of data. Thus, we omit the corporate governance variables from the 
main regressions, and hereby test the robustness of the results with their inclusion. In Models 5 to 10 of 
Table 8, we show that the multinationality premium does not only remain positive and significant for 
the short-run announcement returns and the long-run operating performance, but also for the long-run 
buy-and-hold abnormal return.     
[INSERT TABLE 8] 
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Third, as in Aabo et al. (2015) and Park et al. (2013), we reduce the 50% threshold for our 
alternative definition of multinationality (i.e., MNC dummy) to 40% and 30% and re-examine our key 
issue. The conclusion of there being a multinationality premium in M&As remains positive and 
significant, except for the long-run performance model with the 30% threshold definition of 
multinationality (see Models 1 to 4 of Table 9).  
Finally, we test whether the multinationality premium we have reported is confounded by the 
acquiring firm’s pre-merger product diversification. To conduct this analysis, we directly control for 
the firm’s level of pre-merger product diversification in the multivariate regression in Eq. (1). The 
results reported in Models 5 to 6 of Table 9 are consistent with our main findings and conclusions. Thus, 
our reported multinationality premium is likely to result purely from the MNC’s geographic scope. It is 
noteworthy that the product diversification variable is insignificantly related to acquisition returns, 
indicating that it could validly serve as an instrument in our Heckman selection models.        
    [INSERT TABLE 9] 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
This paper utilises a large mergers and acquisitions (M&A) dataset to provide new empirical 
insights into the value of corporate multinationality (i.e., the extent of foreign involvement). It takes a 
multi-theoretic perspective, drawing from the resource endowment and organisational capabilties 
theories (from the international business and strategy literature), as well as the agency theory (from the 
finance and economics literature) to hypothesise and test how variations in both the short- and long-run 
performance of M&A (i.e., M&A announcement period returns, changes in operating performance, and 
post-acquisition buy-and-hold abnormal returns) may be explained by the multinationality of the 
acquiring firm. Unlike most existing M&A studies about geographic scope which focus on the 
geographic characteristic of the M&A transaction (i.e., analysis of cross-border vs. domestic M&A), 
the focus in this study is on the geographic feature of the acquiring firm prior to the announcement of 
the M&A deal (i.e., analysis of multinational vs. non-multinational corporations). That is, we examine 
whether the M&A returns achieved by multinationals (MNCs) is systematically higher or lower than 
the returns obtained by their non-multinational counterparts. 
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The findings, based on multivariate regressions that control for a wide range of firm-specific and 
deal-specific factors, as well as the endogeneity of the global diversification decision, indicate that 
higher levels of multinationality are (on average) associated with significantly higher announcement 
period returns, ranging from 1.3% to 2.7%, depending on the event window and the multinationality 
proxy utilised. This finding denotes the presence of a multinationality premium in M&A announcement 
returns and implies that investors see MNC’s valuable resources/organisational capabilities as a source 
of competitive advantage that can deliver M&A success. The results are consistent with the view that 
corporate multinationality may increase firm value and suggest corporate acquisitions as a specific 
vehicle through which MNCs can enhance their value. Long-run results, particularly those based on 
operating performance, also support the existence of a significant multinationality premium in M&As.  
The results contained in this paper further suggest that there has not been any significant change 
in the value of corporate multinationality over time, despite the advancement in information sharing 
and retrieval technologies, reductions in information asymmetry, and a more integrated global market 
in recent years. Finally, there is evidence in this paper to suggest that the multinationality premium is 
not symmetric across all firms and all deal types. Instead, the multinationality premium is higher or 
perhaps restricted to deals involving foreign targets in advanced economies. The multinationality 
premium in M&As is also observed in large firms, firms with high board network, firms with high 
acquisition experience, and firms with low agency problems.  Overall, these results provide some 
empirical evidence in support of the view that the multinationality premium may emanate from the 
superior resource capacities associated with MNCs and the ability to curb agency problems. 
Although we provide important empirical insights on the value implications of corporate 
multinationality in M&As, our analysis and conclusions are based on a limited UK sample. Thus, 
interpretation and application of the results, especially in a non-UK context should be done with caution. 
To this end, future studies can extend this research by employing a global sample for its analysis to 
examine the applicability of the findings outside the UK.  Similarly, and like all archival studies of this 
nature, our proxies for multinationality, returns, and governance, amongst others, may or may not reflect 
practice. Future studies may, therefore, offer new insights by conducting in-depth interviews and case 
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Table 1: Sample distribution by year, degree of multinationality and industry 
 Multinationality Industry Full sample 
Year MNC Non-MNC % Consum. Indus. Mater. Media R_Est. Retail Telecom Number % 
1987 0 9 0% 0 6 0 1 2 0 0 9 0.15% 
1988 0 21 0% 5 8 4 2 1 1 0 21 0.35% 
1989 0 41 0% 18 6 7 2 2 6 0 41 0.68% 
1990 12 49 20% 34 10 8 3 1 5 0 61 1.01% 
1991 22 106 17% 43 24 25 10 6 19 1 128 2.13% 
1992 33 151 18% 75 46 30 7 2 24 0 184 3.06% 
1993 44 194 18% 88 66 33 17 13 20 1 238 3.95% 
1994 67 270 20% 92 106 58 43 19 19 0 337 5.60% 
1995 96 245 28% 105 108 50 47 12 18 1 341 5.66% 
1996 80 254 24% 88 115 48 41 19 19 4 334 5.55% 
1997 91 313 23% 87 125 69 32 47 35 9 404 6.71% 
1998 98 371 21% 112 124 65 45 68 43 12 469 7.79% 
1999 94 315 23% 126 85 43 66 54 25 10 409 6.79% 
2000 93 253 27% 93 76 24 60 56 25 12 346 5.75% 
2001 66 176 27% 73 65 16 47 11 20 10 242 4.02% 
2002 56 158 26% 66 42 25 40 15 18 8 214 3.55% 
2003 46 127 27% 48 37 21 24 15 22 6 173 2.87% 
2004 47 190 20% 75 51 25 36 16 23 11 237 3.94% 
2005 47 200 19% 68 63 17 50 14 25 10 247 4.10% 
2006 79 234 25% 114 78 27 39 27 20 8 313 5.20% 
2007 94 251 27% 115 90 26 47 37 20 10 345 5.73% 
2008 82 129 39% 80 71 12 17 8 16 7 211 3.50% 
2009 30 58 34% 31 22 10 9 5 10 1 88 1.46% 
2010 65 96 40% 52 32 16 19 14 18 10 161 2.67% 
2011 68 84 45% 44 42 15 22 15 11 3 152 2.52% 
2012 45 80 36% 38 27 14 18 14 11 3 125 2.08% 
2013 53 93 36% 40 29 9 20 30 12 6 146 2.42% 
2014 15 31 33% 14 10 3 9 6 0 4 46 0.76% 
Total 1523 4499 25% 1824 1564 700 773 529 485 147 6022 100.00% 
% 25% 75% 25% 30% 26% 12% 13% 9% 8% 2% 100%  
This table summarises the sample across the sample period, the degrees of multinationality and the industry of the acquiring firms. The industry classifications are 
based on the primary industry of the acquiring firm as identified by SDC. Consum., Indus. Mater. And E.Est. above refers to the Consumer Goods industry, 
Industrial firms, Material industry, and Real Estates industry, respectively. Multinationality is defined in Appendix A2. 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Full sample MNC Non-MNC Mean diff 
 Obs. Mean Std. dev Min. Max.  Obs. Mean Obs. Mean (8) - (10) 
Multinationality            
Foreign sales ratio (FSR)  6022 0.2612 0.3017 0.0000 1.0000 1523 0.7099 4499 0.1092 0.6006*** 
MNC dummy 6022 0.2529 0.4347 0.0000 1.0000 1523 1.0000 4499 0.0000  
           
M&A returns measures           
CAR (-1, +1) 6022 0.0113 0.0533 -0.2092 0.3111 1523 0.0114 4499 0.0113 0.0001 
CAR (-2, +2) 6022 0.0119 0.0628 -0.2534 0.3463 1523 0.0124 4499 0.0118 0.0006 
CAR (-5, +5) 6022 0.0113 0.0866 -0.3435 0.4456 1523 0.0129 4499 0.0107 0.0022 
Adjusted ROA 4197 -0.0033 0.0788 -0.1779 0.1493 1207 -0.0064 2990 -0.0021 -0.0044 
Adjusted BHAR 4266 0.0949 0.7716 -0.9870 1.8831 1079 0.2134 3187 0.0548 0.1586*** 
           
Control variables           
Firm characteristics           
Size 6022 12.1630 1.8932 0.6931 18.9613 1523 13.4431 4499 11.7296 1.7134*** 
Cash ratio 6022 0.1001 0.1054 0.0010 0.6181 1523 0.1194 4499 0.0936 0.0258*** 
Tobin's q 6022 1.7219 0.7989 0.8537 3.9782 1523 1.8805 4499 1.6683 0.2122*** 
Leverage 6022 0.2446 0.9060 0.0000 68.0000 1523 0.2496 4499 0.2429 0.0068 
Intangibles 6022 0.1664 0.2232 -0.0195 0.9612 1523 0.2109 4499 0.1513 0.0596*** 
Age 6022 17.8399 12.9100 0.5671 49.2466 1523 23.8380 4499 15.8095 8.0286*** 
M&A experience  6022 0.6360 0.4812 0.0000 1.0000 1523 0.7098 4499 0.6110 0.0988*** 
           
Deal characteristics           
Foreign target 6022 0.3288 0.4698 0.0000 1.0000 1523 0.6888 4499 0.2069 0.4818*** 
Related target 6022 0.4756 0.4994 0.0000 1.0000 1523 0.4445 4499 0.4861 -0.0416*** 
Public target 6022 0.0588 0.2352 0.0000 1.0000 1523 0.0683 4499 0.0556 0.0127* 
Hi-tech target 6022 0.0676 0.2511 0.0000 1.0000 1523 0.0827 4499 0.0625 0.0203*** 
Bankrupt target 6022 0.0141 0.1180 0.0000 1.0000 1523 0.0066 4499 0.0167 -0.0101*** 
Cash deal 6022 0.5629 0.4961 0.0000 1.0000 1523 0.6356 4499 0.5383 0.0972*** 
Stock deal 6022 0.0374 0.1897 0.0000 1.0000 1523 0.0204 4499 0.0431 -0.0228*** 
Hostile deal 6022 0.0020 0.0446 0.0000 1.0000 1523 0.0026 4499 0.0018 0.0008 
Relative size 6022 0.0902 0.1278 0.0018 0.4877 1523 0.0615 4499 0.0999 -0.0384*** 
Completion days 6022 22.2008 73.9651 0.0000 3652.00 1523 23.9422 4499 21.6113 2.3310 
           
Governance variables           
Board network 2071 6.5454 0.8320 2.8764 7.9788 582 6.8376 1489 6.4312 0.4063*** 
Board independence 2071 0.4235 0.1904 0.0000 0.8000 582 0.5041 1489 0.3919 0.1122*** 
Board diversity 2071 0.0643 0.0931 0.0000 0.6000 582 0.0642 1489 0.0644 -0.0002 
This table summarises the descriptive statistics for the study’s variables. ***, **, and * denote statistically significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Variables are explained in Appendix A2. Note that MNCs 
having significantly lower relative size doesn’t imply they buy smaller targets or engage in smaller deals. The average deal value for MNCs is £195.12m, compared to £65.65 for non-MNC 
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Table 3: Correlation matrix 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 
Foreign sales ratio 1.00                           
MNC dummy 0.87 1.00                          
CAR (-1, +1) -0.01 0.00 1.00                         
CAR (-2, +2) -0.01 0.00 0.89 1.00                        
CAR (-5, +5) 0.00 0.01 0.66 0.77 1.00                       
Adjusted ROA -0.05 -0.03 0.06 0.06 0.02 1.00                      
Adjusted BHAR 0.06 0.09 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.17 1.00                     
Size 0.46 0.39 -0.09 -0.07 -0.05 -0.09 0.15 1.00                    
Cash ratio 0.13 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.02 -0.11 1.00                   
Tobin's q 0.12 0.12 -0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.09 0.02 -0.11 0.29 1.00                  
Leverage -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.05 -0.02 0.01 -0.06 0.02 0.04 1.00                 
Intangibles 0.17 0.12 0.04 0.03 0.03 -0.10 -0.03 0.07 -0.05 0.01 -0.02 1.00                
Age 0.31 0.27 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.42 -0.03 -0.13 -0.02 -0.09 1.00               
M&A experience  0.10 0.09 -0.05 -0.03 -0.02 -0.06 0.00 0.16 -0.02 0.10 -0.01 0.09 0.02 1.00              
Foreign target 0.54 0.45 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.06 0.05 0.31 0.11 0.14 0.02 0.10 0.18 0.06 1.00             
Related target -0.05 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.05 -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 0.02 0.05 -0.11 -0.01 0.00 1.00            
Public target 0.03 0.02 -0.07 -0.06 -0.04 -0.02 0.01 0.14 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.04 -0.07 -0.02 0.01 1.00           
Hi-tech target 0.07 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 0.03 0.05 0.10 -0.01 0.17 -0.03 0.03 0.05 -0.13 0.02 1.00          
Bankrupt target -0.05 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 0.00 -0.05 -0.02 -0.03 -0.06 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 1.00         
Cash deal 0.06 0.09 -0.04 -0.04 -0.01 0.03 0.12 0.21 -0.06 -0.07 0.00 -0.11 0.13 0.03 0.10 0.01 -0.12 -0.04 0.08 1.00        
Stock deal -0.06 -0.05 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 0.02 -0.05 -0.13 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.00 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.01 0.19 0.01 -0.02 -0.22 1.00       
Hostile deal 0.00 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.03 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.18 0.00 -0.01 -0.04 0.03 1.00      
Relative size -0.15 -0.13 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.04 -0.10 -0.36 0.13 0.15 0.05 0.05 -0.20 -0.19 -0.08 0.03 0.23 0.02 -0.04 -0.27 0.18 0.10 1.00     
Completion days 0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.04 0.00 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.04 -0.07 0.06 0.01 0.22 -0.01 -0.02 -0.07 0.09 0.06 0.19 1.00    
Board network  0.23 0.22 -0.02 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.38 -0.03 0.03 0.01 0.10 0.17 0.06 0.13 -0.01 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.07 -0.08  -0.14 0.02 1.00   
Board independence 0.34 0.26 -0.08 -0.07 -0.08 -0.05 0.12 0.53 -0.07 0.00 0.07 -0.06 0.25 0.06 0.16 -0.02 0.05 0.00 -0.01 0.12 -0.12  -0.21 0.03 0.36 1.00  
Board diversity -0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.04 0.15 0.06 0.08 -0.01 0.16 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.11 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.04 0.00  -0.02 0.00 0.15 0.12 1.00 
The table shows the correlation matrix among variables. Variables are explained in Appendix A2. Figures in bold are significant at 10% levels and below. No hostile deals among the data with governance variables. 
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Table 4: Average multinationality effect based on short-term announcement returns 
Models / Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Standard OLS regressions Heckman two-stage procedure 
 CAR (-1, +1) CAR (-2, +2) CAR (-5, +5) CAR (-1, +1) CAR (-2, +2) CAR (-5, +5) 
Foreign sales ratio 0.022***  0.023***  0.027**  0.022***  0.023***  0.019  
 (0.002)  (0.005)  (0.022)  (0.003)  (0.008)  (0.104)  
MNC dummy  0.013***  0.015***  0.021***  0.013***  0.015***  0.019*** 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.004) 
Size -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.005 -0.004 -0.007* -0.006* -0.004 -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.242) (0.305) (0.282) (0.342) (0.177) (0.206) (0.063) (0.082) (0.290) (0.336) (0.856) (0.868) 
Cash ratio -0.008 -0.007 0.003 0.003 0.033 0.033 -0.021 -0.021 0.003 0.004 0.033 0.032 
 (0.591) (0.617) (0.872) (0.855) (0.131) (0.132) (0.293) (0.305) (0.886) (0.876) (0.289) (0.300) 
Tobin's q -0.004** -0.004* -0.007*** -0.007** -0.007* -0.006* -0.008*** -0.008** -0.008** -0.008** -0.006 -0.006 
 (0.047) (0.051) (0.009) (0.010) (0.074) (0.082) (0.009) (0.011) (0.020) (0.023) (0.217) (0.228) 
Leverage -0.001* -0.001* -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.001** -0.001** -0.002** -0.002** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (0.055) (0.063) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.024) (0.029) (0.016) (0.018) (0.000) (0.000) 
Intangibles -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.013 -0.007 -0.007 -0.020 -0.019 -0.016 -0.015 -0.009 -0.010 
 (0.241) (0.266) (0.331) (0.344) (0.745) (0.731) (0.179) (0.195) (0.351) (0.360) (0.695) (0.655) 
Age 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.008* 0.008* 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.011** 0.011** 
 (0.167) (0.195) (0.276) (0.314) (0.083) (0.096) (0.239) (0.270) (0.243) (0.273) (0.025) (0.028) 
Foreign target 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.919) (0.847) (0.753) (0.802) (0.838) (0.857) (0.917) (0.861) (0.626) (0.656) (0.748) (0.734) 
Related target -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.004* -0.003* -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.102) (0.118) (0.305) (0.336) (0.961) (0.924) (0.063) (0.073) (0.164) (0.181) (0.737) (0.752) 
Public target -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.017** -0.017** -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015** -0.016** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.014) (0.012) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.003) (0.026) (0.023) 
Hi-tech target -0.000 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.003 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.998) (0.990) (0.516) (0.501) (0.839) (0.816) (0.919) (0.913) (0.555) (0.543) (0.994) (0.980) 
Cash deal -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 0.002 0.002 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.002 0.002 
 (0.718) (0.658) (0.813) (0.753) (0.482) (0.526) (0.898) (0.832) (0.973) (0.964) (0.566) (0.602) 
Stock deals -0.005 -0.005 -0.008 -0.009 -0.016 -0.016 -0.004 -0.003 -0.007 -0.007 -0.012 -0.013 
 (0.499) (0.502) (0.275) (0.272) (0.118) (0.113) (0.633) (0.641) (0.398) (0.396) (0.245) (0.231) 
Multiple acquirer -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.461) (0.414) (0.589) (0.540) (0.756) (0.801) (0.473) (0.423) (0.638) (0.584) (0.715) (0.751) 
Bankrupt target -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.007 -0.007 
 (0.606) (0.608) (0.789) (0.794) (0.808) (0.815) (0.583) (0.589) (0.643) (0.651) (0.507) (0.515) 
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Hostile deals -0.019 -0.020 -0.016 -0.017 0.008 0.006 -0.018 -0.020 -0.019 -0.021 0.004 0.002 
 (0.345) (0.303) (0.412) (0.358) (0.688) (0.758) (0.388) (0.339) (0.363) (0.308) (0.846) (0.914) 
Relative size 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.063*** 0.064*** 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.074*** 0.074*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Completion days 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 (0.503) (0.485) (0.424) (0.408) (0.818) (0.797) (0.413) (0.394) (0.346) (0.328) (0.919) (0.896) 
Inverse Mills ratio       -0.016 -0.016 -0.006 -0.006 0.013 0.013 
       (0.191) (0.198) (0.691) (0.699) (0.503) (0.514) 
Firm-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.096*** 0.092*** 0.014 0.010 0.023 0.019 0.148*** 0.143*** 0.036 0.031 -0.005 -0.006 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.714) (0.805) (0.729) (0.783) (0.005) (0.006) (0.561) (0.610) (0.953) (0.939) 
Number of deals 6022.000 6022.000 6022.000 6022.000 6022.000 6022.000 5514.000 5514.000 5514.000 5514.000 5514.000 5514.000 
R-squared 0.335 0.335 0.331 0.331 0.309 0.310 0.340 0.341 0.335 0.336 0.315 0.317 
This table presents results for the multinationality effect on acquiring firms’ short-run announcement returns based on standard OLS and Heckman selection procedures. Variables are explained in Appendix A2. Figures in 

























Table 5: Average multinationality effect based on long-run returns and time period analysis 
Models / Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 OLS: Long-run returns Heckman: Long-run returns OLS: Time period 
 Ind.-adj.-ROA Ind.-adj.-BHAR Ind.-adj.-ROA Ind.-adj.-BHAR CAR (-1, +1) Ind.-adj.-ROA 
Foreign sales ratio 0.033***  -0.109  0.039***  -0.073  0.021**  0.038***  
 (0.004)  (0.209)  (0.000)  (0.426)  (0.017)  (0.004)  
MNC dummy  0.018***  0.027  0.019***  0.045  0.013**  0.018*** 
  (0.001)  (0.539)  (0.000)  (0.312)  (0.015)  (0.007) 
Foreign sales ratio X Period_2         0.001  -0.009  
         (0.859)  (0.379)  
MNC dummy X Period_2          0.000  -0.001 
          (0.966)  (0.930) 
Size -0.031*** -0.030*** -0.489*** -0.493*** -0.012* -0.011 -0.571*** -0.575*** -0.003 -0.002 -0.031*** -0.030*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.084) (0.104) (0.000) (0.000) (0.267) (0.316) (0.000) (0.000) 
Cash ratio 0.063** 0.064** -0.145 -0.166 0.152*** 0.152*** -0.422* -0.434* -0.007 -0.007 0.061** 0.064** 
 (0.013) (0.011) (0.350) (0.286) (0.000) (0.000) (0.095) (0.087) (0.603) (0.623) (0.016) (0.011) 
Tobin's -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.322*** -0.320*** 0.001 0.001 -0.385*** -0.382*** -0.004** -0.004* -0.013*** -0.012*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.851) (0.822) (0.000) (0.000) (0.049) (0.052) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage 0.042** 0.041** -0.145 -0.135 0.045*** 0.043*** -0.205* -0.199* -0.001* -0.001* 0.041** 0.041** 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.210) (0.239) (0.007) (0.009) (0.087) (0.095) (0.059) (0.065) (0.012) (0.014) 
Intangibles -0.021 -0.019 -0.367*** -0.392*** 0.012 0.014 -0.419** -0.434** -0.015 -0.014 -0.019 -0.019 
 (0.328) (0.381) (0.008) (0.005) (0.594) (0.543) (0.015) (0.012) (0.243) (0.268) (0.378) (0.389) 
Age 0.005 0.005 0.083** 0.082** 0.010 0.010 0.039 0.036 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 
 (0.442) (0.456) (0.041) (0.046) (0.140) (0.158) (0.375) (0.408) (0.162) (0.196) (0.514) (0.462) 
Foreign target -0.005* -0.005* -0.008 -0.011 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.006 0.000 0.000 -0.005* -0.005* 
 (0.050) (0.059) (0.721) (0.632) (0.118) (0.139) (0.879) (0.811) (0.917) (0.847) (0.051) (0.059) 
Related target 0.006** 0.006*** 0.003 0.002 0.006** 0.006** 0.009 0.009 -0.003 -0.003 0.006** 0.006*** 
 (0.011) (0.008) (0.903) (0.925) (0.017) (0.012) (0.676) (0.678) (0.102) (0.119) (0.011) (0.008) 
Public target 0.008 0.008 0.085** 0.085** 0.009 0.008 0.083* 0.083* -0.017*** -0.017*** 0.008 0.008 
 (0.114) (0.141) (0.044) (0.043) (0.101) (0.130) (0.057) (0.058) (0.000) (0.000) (0.107) (0.141) 
Hi-tech target -0.004 -0.004 -0.046 -0.046 -0.005 -0.005 -0.042 -0.041 -0.000 0.000 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.310) (0.315) (0.239) (0.243) (0.220) (0.222) (0.287) (0.294) (0.998) (0.990) (0.312) (0.315) 
Cash deal 0.002 0.002 0.023 0.024 0.001 0.001 0.026 0.026 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.002 
 (0.369) (0.406) (0.238) (0.232) (0.502) (0.557) (0.208) (0.204) (0.720) (0.659) (0.393) (0.409) 
Stock deals 0.005 0.006 -0.006 -0.011 0.004 0.004 -0.010 -0.016 -0.005 -0.005 0.005 0.006 
 (0.503) (0.494) (0.927) (0.863) (0.651) (0.618) (0.878) (0.808) (0.499) (0.502) (0.509) (0.495) 
Multiple acquirer -0.002 -0.002 -0.016 -0.016 -0.002 -0.002 -0.031 -0.031 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.577) (0.489) (0.542) (0.542) (0.580) (0.487) (0.252) (0.247) (0.462) (0.415) (0.577) (0.489) 
Bankrupt target 0.006 0.006 -0.059 -0.060 0.006 0.006 -0.047 -0.048 -0.003 -0.003 0.006 0.006 
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 (0.514) (0.515) (0.448) (0.444) (0.550) (0.539) (0.565) (0.562) (0.608) (0.609) (0.517) (0.516) 
Hostile deals -0.044** -0.045** 0.126 0.127 -0.031* -0.034* 0.207 0.207 -0.019 -0.020 -0.043** -0.045** 
 (0.034) (0.025) (0.502) (0.503) (0.078) (0.059) (0.288) (0.292) (0.344) (0.303) (0.037) (0.026) 
Relative size -0.023* -0.022* -0.259** -0.256** -0.026* -0.025* -0.226** -0.222** 0.049*** 0.049*** -0.023* -0.022* 
 (0.084) (0.087) (0.012) (0.013) (0.054) (0.056) (0.036) (0.039) (0.000) (0.000) (0.080) (0.087) 
Completion days 0.002** 0.002** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.001** 0.001** 0.016** 0.016** 0.000 0.000 0.002** 0.002** 
 (0.022) (0.019) (0.009) (0.009) (0.041) (0.038) (0.011) (0.011) (0.505) (0.486) (0.021) (0.019) 
Inverse Mills ratio     0.083*** 0.082*** -0.307* -0.307*     
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.092) (0.091)     
Period_2         -0.025 -0.023 0.017 0.015 
         (0.290) (0.332) (0.387) (0.437) 
Firm-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -0.070 -0.071 3.244*** 3.240*** -0.609*** -0.600*** 4.859*** 4.861*** 0.096*** 0.091*** -0.081 -0.086 
 (0.612) (0.607) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.559) (0.539) 
Number of deals 4197.000 4197.000 4266.000 4266.000 3932.000 3932.000 3929.000 3929.000 6022.000 6022.000 4197.000 4197.000 
R-squared 0.619 0.619 0.713 0.712 0.627 0.627 0.712 0.712 0.335 0.335 0.619 0.619 
This table presents results for the multinationality effect on acquiring firms’ acquisition performance based on standard OLS and Heckman selection procedures. Period 1 refers to years 1987-1999 while Period 2 refers to 2000-2014. 
























Table 6: Average multinationality effect based on CAR (-1, +1) – Superior capabilities and agency analysis 
Models / Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Superior capabilities perspective Agency perspective 
 Firm size Board network Acquisition experience Free-cash flow Audit quality 
 Large Small High Low Multiple Single High Low High Low 
Foreign sales ratio 0.023** 0.020 0.062*** -0.008 0.021** 0.028 0.013 0.039** 0.022*** 0.016 
 (0.013) (0.187) (0.004) (0.781) (0.023) (0.117) (0.257) (0.011) (0.009) (0.320) 
Size 0.000 -0.004 0.001 -0.009 0.000 -0.006 0.002 -0.004 0.001 -0.004 
 (0.913) (0.313) (0.927) (0.355) (0.966) (0.217) (0.511) (0.271) (0.841) (0.298) 
Cash ratio 0.006 -0.019 0.021 -0.000 -0.006 0.016 0.018 -0.261*** 0.011 -0.020 
 (0.752) (0.374) (0.625) (0.997) (0.737) (0.593) (0.345) (0.003) (0.531) (0.382) 
Tobin's -0.000 -0.006* 0.001 -0.014** -0.009*** -0.004 -0.010*** -0.002 -0.003 -0.007* 
 (0.930) (0.068) (0.936) (0.034) (0.002) (0.445) (0.003) (0.590) (0.388) (0.061) 
Leverage -0.009 -0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.007 0.001 -0.000 0.022 -0.000 0.008 
 (0.539) (0.271) (0.985) (0.975) (0.590) (0.949) (0.693) (0.209) (0.269) (0.343) 
Intangibles -0.000 -0.026 0.013 -0.008 -0.015 -0.002 0.005 -0.021 -0.014 -0.031 
 (0.996) (0.239) (0.670) (0.853) (0.325) (0.935) (0.791) (0.298) (0.356) (0.164) 
Age 0.001 0.006 0.014* 0.006 0.000 0.009 0.001 0.004 0.003 0.002 
 (0.846) (0.188) (0.088) (0.471) (0.878) (0.222) (0.750) (0.442) (0.548) (0.615) 
Foreign target 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.005 -0.000 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.003 
 (0.630) (0.828) (0.717) (0.415) (0.963) (0.598) (0.592) (0.922) (0.683) (0.465) 
Related target -0.002 -0.004 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.005 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.004 
 (0.407) (0.211) (0.853) (0.641) (0.784) (0.274) (0.188) (0.795) (0.377) (0.182) 
Public target -0.011** -0.033*** -0.030*** -0.008 -0.013*** -0.028*** -0.023*** -0.012* -0.009* -0.034*** 
 (0.013) (0.000) (0.002) (0.499) (0.008) (0.001) (0.000) (0.052) (0.061) (0.000) 
Hi-tech target 0.003 -0.002 0.006 -0.012 0.000 -0.003 -0.006 0.007 0.001 -0.002 
 (0.466) (0.755) (0.363) (0.258) (0.919) (0.789) (0.174) (0.285) (0.821) (0.839) 
Cash deal 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.004 -0.005* 0.002 -0.002 
 (0.808) (0.583) (0.518) (0.925) (0.852) (0.826) (0.104) (0.081) (0.375) (0.440) 
Stock deals 0.008 -0.008 -0.003 -0.052*** -0.001 -0.015 -0.001 -0.003 0.007 -0.006 
 (0.491) (0.360) (0.853) (0.007) (0.872) (0.305) (0.902) (0.751) (0.563) (0.491) 
Multiple acquirer -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.005 -0.001 -0.003 0.000 
 (0.323) (0.706) (0.758) (0.981) (.) (.) (0.120) (0.780) (0.268) (0.889) 
Bankrupt target 0.005 -0.008 0.018 0.001 0.004 -0.009 0.004 -0.011 -0.006 -0.003 
 (0.600) (0.336) (0.364) (0.975) (0.563) (0.609) (0.631) (0.281) (0.548) (0.689) 
Hostile deals -0.040* 0.025 0.000 0.000 -0.035 0.012 -0.003 -0.050*** -0.045* 0.019 
 (0.080) (0.487) (.) (.) (0.120) (0.648) (0.919) (0.000) (0.082) (0.453) 
Relative size 0.058*** 0.049*** 0.078*** 0.030 0.039*** 0.053** 0.048*** 0.053*** 0.070*** 0.041*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.368) (0.004) (0.038) (0.003) (0.002) (0.000) (0.007) 
Completion days 0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 
 (0.324) (0.709) (0.331) (0.501) (0.798) (0.483) (0.691) (0.990) (0.418) (0.850) 
Firm-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Year-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.002 0.084** -0.009 0.149 0.014 0.075 0.022 0.090 0.001 0.133*** 
 (0.975) (0.021) (0.917) (0.268) (0.748) (0.265) (0.548) (0.168) (0.980) (0.001) 
Number of deals 2721.000 3301.000 1004.000 1067.000 3830.000 2192.000 3023.000 2999.000 2728.000 3294.000 
R-squared 0.255 0.407 0.419 0.445 0.296 0.571 0.439 0.424 0.305 0.438 
This table presents results for the multinationality effect on acquiring firms’ acquisition performance based on standard OLS regressions. Variables are explained in Appendix A2. Large vs. Small and High vs. Low splits are 









Table 7: Average multinationality effect based on CAR (-1, +1) – Target location analysis (cum UK) 
Models / Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Acquisition type Geographic proximity Economic development 
 Foreign Domestic Europe Non-Europe G7 Non-G7 
Foreign sales ratio 0.026** 0.017 0.024** 0.031** 0.021** 0.021 
 (0.031) (0.120) (0.015) (0.017) (0.011) (0.454) 
Size -0.005 -0.002 -0.001 -0.009* -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.239) (0.581) (0.629) (0.095) (0.569) (0.817) 
Cash ratio 0.034 -0.025 -0.007 -0.004 -0.023 0.098* 
 (0.205) (0.154) (0.684) (0.900) (0.134) (0.098) 
Tobin's -0.002 -0.004 -0.005** 0.004 -0.003 -0.007 
 (0.521) (0.218) (0.045) (0.378) (0.292) (0.253) 
Leverage -0.001* 0.009 0.005 0.014 0.006 -0.001 
 (0.059) (0.530) (0.701) (0.495) (0.611) (0.487) 
Intangibles 0.003 -0.007 -0.011 0.007 -0.013 0.010 
 (0.882) (0.707) (0.480) (0.785) (0.341) (0.811) 
Age 0.007 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.002 0.006 
 (0.153) (0.458) (0.249) (0.409) (0.440) (0.506) 
Foreign target 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 
 (.) (.) (0.912) (.) (0.395) (.) 
Related target 0.000 -0.003 -0.002 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 
 (0.885) (0.158) (0.261) (0.319) (0.198) (0.547) 
Public target -0.013* -0.023*** -0.020*** -0.007 -0.019*** -0.018 
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 (0.064) (0.000) (0.000) (0.327) (0.000) (0.229) 
Hi-tech target 0.003 -0.004 -0.003 0.003 -0.002 0.003 
 (0.631) (0.387) (0.479) (0.679) (0.503) (0.799) 
Cash deal 0.005 -0.004* -0.002 0.004 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.140) (0.071) (0.468) (0.314) (0.288) (0.896) 
Stock deals 0.014 -0.006 -0.003 0.014 -0.005 -0.004 
 (0.535) (0.436) (0.733) (0.512) (0.489) (0.910) 
Multiple acquirer -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.005 -0.002 0.001 
 (0.464) (0.605) (0.493) (0.248) (0.292) (0.899) 
Bankrupt target 0.004 -0.001 -0.001 0.016 -0.003 -0.084 
 (0.703) (0.872) (0.845) (0.202) (0.661) (0.186) 
Hostile deals -0.097*** -0.009 -0.012 -0.106*** -0.018 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.679) (0.571) (0.000) (0.384) (.) 
Relative size 0.083*** 0.039*** 0.044*** 0.087*** 0.049*** 0.043 
 (0.000) (0.005) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.386) 
Completion days 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 
 (0.476) (0.435) (0.541) (0.301) (0.586) (0.622) 
Firm-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.008 0.110*** 0.096*** 0.171*** 0.094*** -0.027 
 (0.919) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.846) 
Number of deals 1980.000 4042.000 4815.000 1207.000 5202.000 820.000 
R-squared 0.446 0.400 0.369 0.565 0.360 0.622 
This table presents results for the multinationality effect on acquiring firms’ acquisition performance based on standard OLS regressions. Variables are 
explained in Appendix A2. Figures in parenthesis are p-values and robust standard errors are selected. ***, **, and * denote that the coefficient is 








Table 8: Robustness tests of the average multinationality effect 
Models / Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Heckman: Prior to MNC transition OLS: Incorporating corporate governance variables 
 CAR (-1, +1) Ind.-adj.-ROA CAR (-1, +1) Ind.-adj.-ROA Ind.-adj.-BHAR 
Foreign sales ratio 0.021***  0.033***  0.030**  0.072***  0.353*  
 (0.006)  (0.004)  (0.022)  (0.000)  (0.052)  
MNC dummy  0.013***  0.016***  0.015**  0.028***  0.261*** 
  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.022)  (0.000)  (0.001) 
Size -0.001 0.000 -0.035*** -0.034*** -0.004 -0.003 -0.059*** -0.058*** -0.500*** -0.488*** 
 (0.739) (0.976) (0.000) (0.000) (0.498) (0.555) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Cash ratio -0.002 0.001 0.050* 0.055** 0.017 0.014 0.046 0.035 -0.738** -0.754** 
 (0.912) (0.939) (0.073) (0.049) (0.523) (0.609) (0.232) (0.367) (0.038) (0.029) 
Tobin's -0.004 -0.003 -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.009** -0.009** -0.018*** -0.019*** -0.427*** -0.425*** 
 (0.165) (0.220) (0.000) (0.000) (0.018) (0.015) (0.003) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage -0.000 -0.000 0.049*** 0.049*** -0.002 -0.002 0.097*** 0.082*** 0.347 0.282 
 (0.246) (0.378) (0.008) (0.009) (0.790) (0.720) (0.002) (0.009) (0.159) (0.241) 
Intangibles -0.015 -0.014 -0.035 -0.033 0.002 0.003 0.016 0.022 0.358 0.431 
 (0.312) (0.335) (0.151) (0.183) (0.930) (0.901) (0.657) (0.555) (0.180) (0.105) 
Age 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.010** 0.010** 0.023** 0.023** 0.122 0.104 
 (0.414) (0.484) (0.857) (0.937) (0.037) (0.039) (0.037) (0.040) (0.130) (0.195) 
Foreign target -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 0.001 0.001 -0.004 -0.004 0.023 0.019 
 (0.767) (0.820) (0.344) (0.388) (0.723) (0.707) (0.324) (0.341) (0.506) (0.578) 
Related target -0.004* -0.004* 0.007** 0.007*** -0.002 -0.001 0.008** 0.009** -0.006 -0.001 
 (0.062) (0.073) (0.011) (0.009) (0.559) (0.633) (0.017) (0.012) (0.846) (0.984) 
Public target -0.018*** -0.018*** 0.015** 0.014** -0.018** -0.019*** 0.001 0.001 0.084 0.086 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.014) (0.022) (0.010) (0.010) (0.904) (0.929) (0.266) (0.264) 
Hi-tech target 0.000 0.000 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.929) (0.920) (0.471) (0.483) (0.706) (0.739) (0.818) (0.805) (0.977) (0.966) 
Cash deal -0.000 -0.001 0.004 0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.038 0.039 
 (0.852) (0.770) (0.131) (0.164) (0.649) (0.672) (0.892) (0.996) (0.247) (0.228) 
Stock deals -0.001 -0.001 0.003 0.003 -0.037*** -0.036*** 0.009 0.010 0.092 0.090 
 (0.920) (0.926) (0.783) (0.743) (0.003) (0.003) (0.657) (0.629) (0.433) (0.439) 
Multiple acquirer -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.011 -0.013 
 (0.482) (0.447) (0.443) (0.394) (0.692) (0.683) (0.627) (0.618) (0.794) (0.766) 
Bankrupt target -0.004 -0.004 0.010 0.010 0.014 0.014 0.004 0.003 -0.154 -0.146 
 (0.562) (0.577) (0.395) (0.378) (0.292) (0.303) (0.824) (0.866) (0.279) (0.308) 
Hostile deals -0.002 -0.003 -0.029 -0.033 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.940) (0.863) (0.267) (0.214) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
Relative size 0.051*** 0.051*** -0.025* -0.025* 0.057*** 0.057*** -0.044** -0.044** -0.126 -0.122 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.090) (0.088) (0.008) (0.008) (0.044) (0.045) (0.426) (0.438) 
Completion days 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.015 0.016 
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 (0.376) (0.349) (0.201) (0.180) (0.348) (0.319) (0.185) (0.144) (0.146) (0.112) 
Inverse Mills ratio 0.010 0.014 -0.028* -0.023       
 (0.348) (0.179) (0.051) (0.124)       
Board network     -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.070 -0.068 
     (0.774) (0.707) (0.525) (0.554) (0.156) (0.168) 
Board independence     0.028 0.029 -0.020 -0.018 0.230 0.258 
     (0.116) (0.106) (0.448) (0.502) (0.318) (0.265) 
Board diversity     -0.003 -0.004 0.058 0.058 0.029 0.001 
     (0.905) (0.871) (0.133) (0.134) (0.937) (0.998) 
Firm-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.012 -0.020 -0.161 -0.189 0.067 0.066 0.639*** 0.634*** 7.359*** 7.194*** 
 (0.869) (0.786) (0.318) (0.251) (0.413) (0.419) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of deals 4917.000 4917.000 3444.000 3444.000 2071.000 2071.000 1504.000 1504.000 1389.000 1389.000 
R-squared 0.345 0.345 0.637 0.637 0.380 0.380 0.694 0.693 0.775 0.778 
This table presents results for the multinationality effect on acquiring firms’ acquisition performance based on standard OLS and Heckman selection procedures. All variables are explained in Appendix A2. Figures in 




Table 9: Robustness test of the average multinationality effect 
Models / Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Alternative definitions of MNC dummy Product diversification control 
 CAR (-1, +1) Ind.-adj.-ROA CAR (-1, +1) Ind.-adj.-ROA 
MNC dummy=FSR>=30% 0.006*  0.006    
 (0.071)  (0.299)    
MNC dummy=FSR>=40%  0.010***  0.012**   
  (0.004)  (0.037)   
Foreign sales ratio      0.022***  0.033*** 
     (0.002) (0.004) 
Size -0.002 -0.003 -0.030*** -0.030*** -0.003 -0.031*** 
 (0.268) (0.247) (0.000) (0.000) (0.189) (0.000) 
Cash ratio -0.006 -0.007 0.066*** 0.065*** -0.007 0.063** 
 (0.672) (0.605) (0.008) (0.010) (0.606) (0.012) 
Tobin's -0.004** -0.004** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.004* -0.012*** 
 (0.049) (0.047) (0.000) (0.000) (0.057) (0.000) 
Leverage -0.001* -0.001* 0.039** 0.040** -0.001** 0.041** 
 (0.050) (0.055) (0.017) (0.015) (0.040) (0.013) 
Intangibles -0.011 -0.013 -0.014 -0.018 -0.014 -0.020 
 (0.363) (0.270) (0.498) (0.392) (0.271) (0.359) 
Age 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.004 0.005 
 (0.181) (0.147) (0.455) (0.396) (0.163) (0.433) 
Foreign target 0.000 0.000 -0.005* -0.005* 0.000 -0.005* 
 (0.824) (0.864) (0.075) (0.063) (0.926) (0.051) 
Related target -0.003 -0.003 0.006*** 0.006** -0.003 0.006** 
 (0.116) (0.105) (0.009) (0.010) (0.111) (0.010) 
Public target -0.017*** -0.017*** 0.008 0.008 -0.017*** 0.008 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.125) (0.118) (0.000) (0.112) 
Hi-tech target -0.000 -0.000 -0.005 -0.005 -0.000 -0.005 
 (0.948) (0.954) (0.281) (0.274) (0.961) (0.292) 
Cash deal -0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.002 
 (0.738) (0.740) (0.373) (0.369) (0.728) (0.368) 
Stock deals -0.004 -0.005 0.006 0.006 -0.005 0.006 
 (0.532) (0.504) (0.436) (0.467) (0.511) (0.490) 
Multiple acquirer -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.419) (0.394) (0.544) (0.523) (0.449) (0.564) 
Bankrupt target -0.003 -0.003 0.007 0.006 -0.003 0.006 
 (0.599) (0.584) (0.510) (0.525) (0.606) (0.515) 
Hostile deals -0.020 -0.019 -0.044** -0.044** -0.019 -0.044** 
 (0.320) (0.336) (0.031) (0.036) (0.343) (0.031) 
Relative size 0.048*** 0.048*** -0.023* -0.023* 0.049*** -0.023* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.078) (0.076) (0.000) (0.082) 
Completion days 0.000 0.000 0.002** 0.002** 0.000 0.002** 
 (0.495) (0.484) (0.023) (0.022) (0.489) (0.021) 




Firm-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.092*** 0.094*** -0.079 -0.082 0.099*** -0.065 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.571) (0.558) (0.001) (0.635) 
number of deals 6022.000 6022.000 4197.000 4197.000 6022.000 4197.000 
R-squared 0.334 0.335 0.618 0.618 0.335 0.619 
Variables are explained in Appendix A2. Figures in parenthesis are p-values. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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        Pre-acquisition  Pre-MNC transition 
Parameter p-value Parameter p-value 
Size 0.328*** (0.000) 0.283*** (0.000) 
Leverage 0.046*** (0.006) 0.024** (0.043) 
Intangibles 1.257*** (0.000) 0.727*** (0.000) 
Tobin's 0.221*** (0.000) 0.156*** (0.000) 
Cash ratio 0.912*** (0.000) 1.100*** (0.000) 
Age 0.017*** (0.000) 0.008*** (0.000) 
Diversification 0.119*** (0.004) -0.049*** (0.000) 
Current ratio 1.029*** (0.000) 0.778*** (0.000) 
R&D 4.762*** (0.000) 5.041*** (0.000) 
Inflation 24.774 (0.429) 14.392 (0.668) 
Industry MNC ratio 0.110*** (0.000) 0.075*** (0.001) 
Industry fixed effect Yes  Yes  
Year fixed effect Yes  Yes  
Constant -6.960*** (0.000) -5.336*** (0.000) 
N 7035.000  6044.000  
Pseudo R2 0.271  0.188  
This table shows the probit regression of the decision to become a MNC. Variables in italics are not included in the 
second-stage regressions. All variables are explained in Appendix A2. Figures in parenthesis are p-values. ***, **, and * 



















Appendix A2: Description of variables 
Proxies for multinationality  
Foreign sales ratio Foreign sales / total sales 
MNC dummy A dummy variable that equals 1 if foreign sales ratio is at least 50% and 0 otherwise. 
  
Performance variables  
CAR (-1, +1) Event study announcement period returns based on the market model and the event window (-1, +1). 
CAR (-2, +2) Event study announcement period returns based on the market model and the event window (-2, +2). 
CAR (-5, +5) Event study announcement period returns based on the market model and the event window (-5, +5). 
Industry-adjusted ROA 
The industry-median-adjusted change in ROA based on the 3 years post-acquisition and the 3-year pre-
acquisition ROA. 
Industry-adjusted BHAR 
The industry-median adjusted difference between the 3-year post-acquisition buy-and-hold returns of 
the acquirer and that of the benchmark portfolio.  
  
Main regression variables  
Firm size The natural log of total assets 
Tobin's q Market to book ratio calculated as (Total assets + market capitalisation - common equity) / total assets 
Liquidity Cash ratio calculated as Cash and cash equivalent / total assets 
Intangibles Intangible assets / total assets 
Firm age 
 




A dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm is a multiple (frequent) acquirer, i.e., makes more than one 
acquisition in a year. 
Foreign target A dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm acquires a target firm in a country other than the UK. 
Bankrupt target 
 
A dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm acquires a target firm which is bankrupt or goes bankrupt 
during the transaction. 
Public target A dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm acquires a target firm which is listed on the exchange. 
High-tech target 
 




A dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm acquires a target firm which shares the same 2-digit SIC code 
with the acquirer. 
Hostile target A dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm acquires a target firm in a hostile (unfriendly) way. 
Cash deals A dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm finances the acquisition entirely with cash. 
Stock deals A dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm finances the acquisition entirely with stock/equity. 
Completion days The number of days between the announcement of the deal and the day the deal was completed. 
Relative size The value of the acquisition deal / total asset of the acquirer. 
  
Other variables  
Product diversification  A dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm is a multi-segment firm based on product segment data. 
Current ratio (Current assets - current liabilities) / total assets 
R&D intensity Research and development (R&D) expenditure / total assets 
Inflation Percentage change in the consumer price index (CPI) over a year 
MNC industry ratio The proportion of MNCs in an industry in a given year 
Audit quality Audit fees / total assets 
Board network 
 
The number of other boards that a director currently sits plus the number of previous boards s/he has 
sat on. 
Board independence The number of independent non-executive directors / total number of members on the board 




                                                          
